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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-3652 
 
JOHN K. WHITEFORD, M.D. 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHN REED, Director of the Professional Liability 
Catastrophic Loss Fund; DANIEL KIMBALL, JR., M.D., 
Chairman of the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine; 
GERALD SMITH, ESQ., Counsel for the State Board of 
Medicine, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 97-cv-01940) 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 17, 1998 
 
BEFORE: BECKER, Chief Judge, STAPLETON and WEIS, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed September 9, 1998) 
 
       John K. Whiteford 
       3245 Miracle Drive 
       Murrysville, PA 15668 
       Appellant, Pro Se 
 
 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Whiteford appeals the district court's dismissal of his 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Whiteford argues that Rooker- 
Feldman is inapplicable because no state court addressed 
the merits of his claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 because the district court's dismal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is a "final order." Application of 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a question of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction over which we exercise plenary review. 
Gulla v. North Strabane Township, 1998 WL 294013, *1 (3d 
Cir. 1998). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that 
Rooker-Feldman does not apply in this case. Accordingly, 
we will reverse and remand the case for further 
consideration by the district court. 
 
I. 
 
Whiteford, a Pennsylvania physician, filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania alleging that Pennsylvania's Health Care 
Services Malpractice Act ("Act") violates several of his 
constitutional rights. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1301.701 
(West 1998). The Act, enacted in response to an apparent 
medical malpractice insurance crisis in 1975, requires 
health care providers covered by the Act to carry minimum 
malpractice insurance ("basic coverage"). 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. 1301.701(a)(1)(i). In addition, the Act establishes the 
Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund (the 
"Fund"), an executive agency of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania1. The Fund was created: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Id. S 1301.701(d). Originally, the Act also included a dispute 
resolution 
section which established arbitration panels with "original exclusive 
jurisdiction" over medical malpractice claims and limited attorney's fees. 
This system was designed to reduce the costs of litigating malpractice 
claims and was as a complement to the Fund. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, however, declared the Act's dispute resolution 
component unconstitutional in Heller v. Frankston, 475 A.2d 1291, 1294 
(Pa. 1984). 
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       for the purpose of paying all awards, judgments and 
       settlements for loss or damages against a health care 
       provider entitled to participate in the fund as a 
       consequence of any claim for professional liability 
       against such health care provider as a defendant or 
       additional defendant to the extent such health care 
       provider's share exceeds its basic coverage in effect at 
       the time of the occurrence. 
 
Id. The Fund is primarily financed through the levying of 
annual surcharges upon health care providers "entitled to 
participate" in the fund. Id. S 1301.701(e). Notably, the Act 
also authorizes the levying of emergency surcharges in the 
event that the Fund's assets are insufficient to satisfy all 
claims in the preceding claims period plus the Fund's 
expenses. S 1301.701(e)(9). 
 
In 1995, the Fund was operating under a $107 million 
deficit. To deal with this deficit, the Fund imposed the first 
emergency surcharge in the Fund's history. Generally, the 
emergency surcharges amounted to several thousand 
dollars per physician. Appellant Whiteford did not pay his 
1995 emergency surcharge. 
 
The Act and applicable regulations provide two major 
consequences for failure to pay surcharges. First, non- 
paying health care providers are no longer "covered by the 
Fund in the event of loss." 31 Pa. Code S 242.17(b). Second, 
non-paying health care providers face possible revocation or 
suspension of their licenses. 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 1301.701(f). 
 
Upon determining that Whiteford had failed to pay his 
1995 emergency surcharge, the Fund initiated formal 
administrative proceedings against Whiteford including a 
hearing held on October 26, 1996.2 At the hearing, 
Whiteford admitted to his failure to pay and presented an 
affirmative defense that the Fund surcharges violated his 
constitutional rights. Additionally, Whiteford informed the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Whiteford filed an action in district court seeking a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the administrative proceedings. The district court 
declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of abstention, and this 
court affirmed. 
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hearing officer that he was no longer carrying medical 
malpractice insurance as required by the Act. 40 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. S 1301.701(a). The hearing examiner declined to 
entertain the constitutional arguments, suspended 
Whiteford's license for 12 days and imposed a $685fine. 
Whiteford petitioned the State Board of Medicine ("Board") 
for review of the hearing examiner's decision under 40 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1301.905(a). The Board similarly refused 
to consider Whiteford's constitutional challenges, affirmed 
the hearing examiner's decisions and increased the 
suspension to 14 days and the fine to $1,000. Whiteford 
petitioned the Commonwealth Court for review of the 
Board's decision, but his petition was dismissed, without 
consideration of his various constitutional claims, because 
Whiteford's petition contained "numerous substantial errors 
which impair[ed the court's] ability to conduct a meaningful 
review." (Appendix A-3). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied Whiteford's petition for appeal. Whiteford v. 
Commonwealth, 702 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1997). 
 
Whiteford then filed this action in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania claiming that the suspension of his license 
and imposition of the fine, as well as the Act generally, 
violated his constitutional rights.3 The district court 
dismissed Whiteford's complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine without 
considering his constitutional claims. In dismissing 
Whiteford's action under Rooker-Feldman the district court 
stated: 
 
       When a plaintiff seeks to litigate a claim in federal 
       court, the existence of a state court judgment in 
       another case bars the federal proceeding under Rooker- 
       Feldman when entertaining the federal court claim 
       would be the equivalent of an appellate review of that 
       order. 
 
(App. B3). The district court was correct in its 
characterization of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Whiteford claimed violations of due process, equal protection, the 
right 
to work, and that the Fund and surcharge constituted an illegal taking, 
bill of attainder and an arbitrary mandate. 
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we conclude that the court incorrectly applied the doctrine 
in this case. 
 
II. 
 
"Under 28 U.S.C. S 1257, state court litigants who have 
appealed an adverse judgment through the state court 
system may seek review in the United States Supreme 
Court; the lower federal courts [however] may not sit in 
direct review of the decisions of a state tribunal." Gulla v. 
North Strabane Township, 1998 WL 294013, *2 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). "Under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, lower federal courts cannot entertain 
constitutional claims that have been previously adjudicated 
in state court or that are inextricably intertwined with a 
state adjudication." Id. (citing FOCUS v. Allegheny County 
Crt. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
       In other words, Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal 
       action if the relief requested in the federal action would 
       effectively reverse the state decision or void its ruling. 
       Accordingly, to determine whether Rooker-Feldman 
       bars [a] federal suit requires determining exactly what 
       the state court held . . . If the relief requested in the 
       federal action requires determining that the state 
       court's decision is wrong or would void the state court's 
       ruling, then the issues are inextricably intertwined and 
       the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction to 
       hear the suit. 
 
FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has 
been interpreted to apply to the decisions of lower state 
courts. In re General Motors Corp. Pick Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prod's Liability Litigation, 134 F.3d 133, 143 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
The state court dismissed Whiteford's appeal of the 
Board's decision because Whiteford's petition contained 
"numerous substantial errors which impair[ed the court's] 
ability to conduct a meaningful review." (App. A3). Thus, 
the court held that he had violated Pennsylvania's rules of 
appellate procedure. Pa. R.A.P 2114-117. Whiteford's 
federal action requested the district court to determine 
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whether the Act's surcharge provisions violated his federal 
constitutional rights. His federal claims did not require the 
district court "[to] determin[e] that the state court's decision 
[was] wrong or [to] void the state court's ruling." FOCUS, 75 
F.3d at 840. The district court was not requested to 
interpret Pennsylvania's rules of appellate procedure, it was 
asked to interpret the Constitution. Rooker-Feldman does 
not preclude the district court from exercising its 
jurisdiction in this manner. 
 
Moreover, this court has consistently held that where a 
state action does not reach the merits of a plaintiff's claims, 
then Rooker-Feldman does not deprive the federal court of 
jurisdiction. See Gulla, 1998 WL 294013, at *4; E.B. v. 
Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1091 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that 
if state court had not decided merits of plaintiff's claim, 
then Rooker-Feldman would not bar federal action). For 
instance, in Gulla the plaintiffs brought a constitutional 
challenge in state court to a municipality's decision 
regarding subdivision of property adjacent to their own. 
Gulla, 1998 WL 294013, at *1. The state court dismissed 
plaintiffs' action because it concluded that they lacked 
standing under state law. Id. Plaintiffs then filed a federal 
action alleging constitutional violations. This court 
determined that Rooker-Feldman was inapplicable: 
 
       [W]e conclude that the Gullas are not precluded from 
       bringing their federal claims because the state court 
       could not and did not adjudicate the merits of their 
       constitutional claims. Rather, the state court noted 
       that the Gullas lacked standing to raise their 
       constitutional claims . . . Since the Gullas could not 
       obtain an adjudication of their claims in state court, 
       they are not precluded from raising their constitutional 
       claims in the federal forum. 
 
Id. at *5. Similarly, Whiteford could not obtain an 
adjudication of his constitutional claims in state court and 
Rooker-Feldman does not preclude him from seeking review 
in federal court. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the district court erred when it 
dismissed Whiteford's complaint under the Rooker-Feldman 
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doctrine. We will reverse and remand so that the district 
court may consider his claims. 
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